Our moral convictions cannot, on the face of it, count in evidence against scientific claims with which they happen to conflict. Moral anti-realists of whatever stripe can explain this easily: science is immune to moral refutation because moral discourse is defective as a trustworthy source of true and objective judgments. Moral realists, they can add, are unable to explain this immunity. After describing how anti-realists might implement this reasoning, the paper argues that the only plausible realist comeback turns on the practical nature of moral reasoning. This comeback, however, places significant constraints on the structure of evidence for moral judgments. These constraints cannot be met by coherentist defenders of reflective-equilibrium methodology or by anyone sympathetic to bottom-up, case-driven foundationalism, including those who claim we have perceptual or perception-like access to moral truths. Unfortunately for realists in these categories, alternative realism-friendly accounts of science's apparent moral immunity are unpromising. These neither explain nor explain away our unwillingness to infer an is from an ought, as Hume might have put it. Science's apparent immunity to moral refutation therefore poses a serious problem for any realist unhappy with top-down, theory-driven conceptions of the structure of moral evidence.
The argument centres on a phenomenon that it seems even the most hard-boiled moral realist must acknowledge: our strong resistance to a moral claim's being cited in evidence against a scientific claim with which it is inconsistent. Oddly, this phenomenon has not been pressed into service by anti-realists in the way I am about to set out. I describe the phenomenon in §1, show how readily anti-realists can accommodate it in §2, and consider how moral realists might approach it in §3-either by denying the existence of the phenomenon or by explaining it in a realism-friendly way.
Being a moral realist by inclination, I do not set out to dismiss all realist responses, but several are surprisingly flimsy once one moves beyond their initial appeal, and the single plausible response has serious implications for the structure of moral knowledge. Specifically, I argue in §4 that the phenomenon forces realists towards a top-down, theory-driven foundationalist moral epistemology and away from bottom-up, case-driven moral reasoning, analogies between moral intuition and perception, and reflective-equilibrium coherentism.
Science's moral immunity
The moral-immunity phenomenon has to do with how we may respond to scientific (or purportedly scientific) studies that challenge (or purportedly challenge) received moral wisdom. Here are sketches of five examples:
(i) Various studies were presented by the authors of a notorious 1994 book, The Bell Curve, as evidence for a partially genetic intellectual hierarchy among racial groups [Herrnstein and Murray 1994] .
(ii) Freewill is an illusion according to neuroscientists who claim to be able to predict which of two options a subject will select, and to do so long before the subject herself is aware of deciding-up to ten seconds before in one study [Soon, Brass et al. 2008] .
(iii) Marine biologists claim to have discovered in fish the behavioural tropes and neural structures that, in humans, are strongly associated with extreme pain and distress (see Braithwaite [2010] for an overview).
(iv) Psychologists and empirically minded philosophers (e.g. Harman [1999] ; Doris [2002] ) have questioned the robustness of character types presupposed in both folk and philosophical versions of virtue-theoretic moral assessment.
(v) According to some physicists, our universe is but one among many physical universes, each isolated from but just as real as the one we inhabit; nothing we do makes any difference to the total good (e.g. the total amount of happiness) across reality's entirety. 2 With due emphasis on the words 'alleged' and 'potentially', these alleged findings potentially conflict with prevailing moral assumptions about, respectively, the just distribution of resources, moral responsibility, food ethics, character assessment, and acting to maximize value. From each example we are able to generate an apparently inconsistent set. Logic then compels us to reject either the alleged scientific finding, the prevailing moral assumption, one of the background assumptions used to generate the apparent inconsistency, or the appearance of inconsistency itself, which could depend on a term's being used ambiguously. The phenomenon of moral immunity is this: while the scientific finding (plus the background assumptions and logic) may count as evidence against the moral assumption, it seems deeply misguided to regard the moral assumption (plus this same background) as evidence against the scientific finding.
2 The 'many-worlds' interpretation of quantum mechanics has an analogue in philosophy, modal realism, the apparent moral implications of which are drawn out by Mark Heller [2003] and others.
To illustrate this we can focus in on two of the examples. In (iii) the scientific claim is that our consumption of fish causes them enormous amounts of pain, and the relevant prevailing moral assumption is that it is morally permissible for us to consume fish. The background needed to generate an apparent inconsistency between the two will include both moral and non-moral assumptions, e.g. that it is morally impermissible for us to cause unnecessary pain, that if our consumption of a sentient creature causes pain and we can survive happily without consuming it then the pain that our consumption causes is unnecessary, and that it is indeed possible for us to survive happily without consuming fish. When assessing the overall strength of evidence for and against the scientific claim, it seems a mistake to include, alongside the various neurological and behavioural studies, the fact that it belongs to this inconsistent set. That fact cannot, for example, be taken as a sign that there is some methodological flaw in the studies' data or in the interpretation of those data (though of course it may quite reasonably motivate a hunt for such flaws).
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(iv) is more complicated. The received moral assumption under threat here is that characterbased commendations or condemnations of people or actions-as honest or cowardly, say-are, often anyway, correct. The main background assumption is that such commendations and condemnations are mistaken unless humans manifest the robust, stable and situation-independent behavioural patterns associated with the relevant character trait. The scientific studies that threaten to generate an inconsistent set purportedly show that humans fail to manifest these patterns. It would be odd, even for someone who attaches high antecedent plausibility to character-based assessments and to this background assumption, to treat this inconsistency as evidence against the studies (as opposed to a motive for scrutinising the studies very closely).
3 Notice that the inconsistent sets can have both axiological and deontological elements. The set in (iii), for example, may contain the deontological requirement that we not cause negative value and the axiological claim that pain has negative value. So someone could account for what I am sweepingly calling science's 'moral' immunity by being realist about deontology but anti-realist about axiology-or vice versa [Tappolet 2000: 63-7] .
Or would it? This case is less straightforward than (iii) because character traits seem to have both a moral and a non-moral dimension built into them, creating space for an objection. Hunches often provide highly defeasible evidence against the scientific studies with which they are inconsistent, and plenty of us have a hunch that the world is indeed populated by the honest and the dishonest, the brave and the cowardly, etc. Does this show that scientific findings aren't, after all, entirely immune to moral counterevidence? To see why not we need to distinguish our ordinary conceptions of the character traits from conceptions that have been stripped of ethical content.
Suppose C is entirely neutral on the commendability or otherwise of the trait of, say, never knowingly misleading one's audience. C has a strong hunch that some people have this trait while others lack it. C's hunch is challenged by the studies in (iv), but equally, C's hunch is a challenge to those studies. D lacks C's neutrality. D has C's hunch plus a hunch that various people are commendable because of their possession of the trait. The immunity phenomenon as it applies to this example is best described as: D's extra hunch adds nothing to C's in the way of evidence for or against the studies in (iv). Some hunches sometimes have evidential import for science, but moral hunches as such never can.
Extrapolating from these and the other examples, we have an (apparent) asymmetry: scientific claims can figure as evidence within the moral domain yet moral claims as such cannot figure as evidence within the scientific domain. Moral realists and anti-realists alike recognize this (apparent) asymmetry, yet anti-realists seem far better placed to account for it (or its appearance). That, in essence, is the argument from moral immunity. But before turning in §2 and §3 to how those in each camp should interpret the immunity phenomenon, I want to bring the phenomenon itself into sharper focus with three important clarifications.
The first is implied by my use of parentheses in the preceding paragraph. I shall speak loosely of 'the moral immunity phenomenon' but it is open to question whether the phenomenon is genuine, i.e. whether science really is immune to moral refutation. At this point in the paper I am only claiming that the appearance of immunity needs to be either explained or explained away. Later we'll see that both strategies are available, to realists and anti-realists alike.
Second, what (apparently, etc.) has immunity from moral considerations is the strength of evidence for rather than the acceptability of a scientific claim. Acceptability is the broader notion. It takes into account practical ramifications as well as strength of evidence. Moral considerations can legitimately enter into deliberations over acceptability because, for example, we formulate social policy on the back of accepted theories. After a risk analysis of the relative costs and benefits of error, we may decide to accept and act on a theory with relatively weak evidential support. Allowing moral and other pragmatic concerns to influence our assessment of acceptability is consistent with refusing to let them influence our assessment of strength of evidence. 4 Finally, granting that science has moral immunity is compatible with a healthy scepticism towards scientific reports that trumpet a particular social outlook. Scientists are human and humans have all manner of conscious and unconscious biases. If a study appears to licence racism, this fact cannot stand as counterevidence in and of itself, but it does give us reason to suspect that we'll find problems with, say, the methodology used or the interpretation of data, since shoddy science with a racist agenda has a rich lineage. (On the The Bell Curve in particular, see Newby and Newby [1995] .)
Anti-realist perspectives on moral immunity
The general form of any anti-realist explanation of science's moral immunity is that moral discourse is defective as a trustworthy source of true and objective judgments. 5 Realists, in contrast, face a difficulty: the more success they have in establishing the credentials of moral judgments, the harder they will find it to explain why moral judgments cannot contribute to settling scientific disputes.
That's the topic for §3. In this section I describe how each of the four main types of anti-realism identified in the introduction might be used to account for the immunity phenomenon, then address a simple objection that applies to all four accounts. This fourfold classification is deliberately coursegrained. My aim here is simply to generate a presumption that anti-realists have plenty of options; the main goal of the paper is to show how narrow the options are for realists.
Moral non-cognitivism: Non-cognitivists ('expressivists') hold that our moral utterances express, not genuine judgments of belief, but mental states for which truth is an inappropriate measure of evaluation. Premises that are not even truth-apt, let alone true, cannot legitimately be used to infer anything that is truth-apt; hence we can never reasonably infer from our moral convictions to the falsity of a scientific theory with which they seem to conflict. This is too simplistic as it stands. Many moral expressivists are also epistemic expressivists, holding that when we give voice to norms in either domain we are expressing non-representational mental states (see e.g. Gibbard [2003] , and Chrisman [2012] for a critical overview). This raises the question of whether moral expressivists can recognize the immunity phenomenon as genuine. They could do so by denying that moral expressivism needs to be matched by expressivism in the epistemic domain, or by embracing the distinction drawn earlier between the acceptability of a theory (to be understood expressivistically) and the strength of evidence for a theory (to be understood non-expressivistically).
Since it is ostensibly about evidence not acceptability, the immunity phenomenon could still be endorsed as genuine. (For sobering thoughts on the prospects for a non-cognitivist understanding of 'evidence', see Schroeder [2010: 183-4] .) Other expressivists, though, may prefer to reject that earlier distinction. For them, to say that science is immune to moral refutation is not so much to describe a phenomenon in need of explanation as to commit to never letting ethical considerations enter into scientific deliberation. This rejection of immunity as a genuine phenomenon would hardly help moral realists, however, since they are unlikely to be epistemic expressivists and so would have to find their own way of explaining-or explaining away-science's apparent moral immunity.
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Moral subjectivism: Moral subjectivists allow that moral utterances express genuine judgments of belief but deny that these judgments are objective. Their truth conditions are tied too closely to the inclination of the judger to make the judgment. If this is right, the feature of our moral convictions that explains why we cannot draw on them to overturn scientific claims is poverty of content. Their content is so proximal that they cannot be used to draw objective scientificdistal-conclusions.
The loose definition offered here sidesteps the vexed topic of how best to understand the subjective/objective distinction. It should, though, be compatible with views that emphasize, for example, mind dependence or relativity to social context (e.g. Prinz [2009] or Harman [1996] ).
Moral scepticism: Scepticism deserves to be classified as a form of moral anti-realism only as it tends towards extreme and generalized pessimism about the quality of evidence available in the moral sphere. Sceptics of this calibre can readily account for its being wrong to pitch moral considerations against scientific evidence, since an argument is only as secure as its premises. I have just outlined four broad ways in which anti-realists could explain or explain away science's apparent moral immunity. A single assumption unifies this otherwise motley group: moral discourse is defective as a trustworthy source of true and objective judgments, disqualifying it as a source of premises with which to challenge an alleged scientific finding. Anti-realists hoping to use the argument from moral immunity against realists do, though, face an interesting puzzle. Pretty much everyone is sympathetic to the thought that science is (genuinely or apparently) immune to moral refutation, but since not everyone is a moral anti-realist it looks as though something other than anti-realist commitments must explain this sympathy. What is this something? And might it not generate an alternative explanation of moral immunity, one that even a realist could embrace?
The simplest response is to defend an 'implicit belief' account of our recognition of moral immunity. Anti-realists can say that only at an explicit, conscious level do any of us hold moral realist views. Below the radar of conscious reflection we are all moral anti-realists. This unconscious commitment reveals itself in our refusal to draw directly on our moral convictions when arguing against scientific evidence, no matter how feeble we regard the latter. The response is less ad hoc than it may seem. First, comparable appeals to the notion of implicit ('tacit', 'unconscious', 'subpersonal') mental states are now extremely widespread in the cognitive sciences. Second, many moral anti-realists are already committed to our minds being somewhat opaque to us. Noncognitivists, for example, accept that we don't consciously appreciate the attitude-type expressed by our moral utterances. If we did, there'd be no debate. What's new on the present proposal is just that at an unconscious level we do appreciate the anti-realist character of our moral outlook-we do appreciate how non-truth-apt our moral attitudes are, for example, though each variant of antirealism will have its own way of spelling out the suggestion.
Realist perspectives on moral immunity
Moral realists in the present context share a characteristic vulnerability. Traditionally they have sought to defend the status of our moral pronouncements-by shrinking an apparent evidence deficit,
by overcoming concerns about a lack of objectivity, and so on. 7 Suppose we grant success to them in this. Suppose we allow that moral judgments are every bit as respectable as judgments in other domains, including science. In doing so we seem to place realists in the embarrassing position of being able to deploy moral considerations against these other judgments whenever there is a clash.
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How can they defuse this embarrassment? We can divide their options into attempts to explain moral immunity away by denying that it is a genuine phenomenon, and attempts to explain the phenomenon in ways that are compatible with realism. In what follows I consider three instances of the explaining-away strategy ((a)-(c)) and two of the explaining strategy ((d) and (e)). Only (e) stands up to scrutiny. I discuss the failed attempts because (e) has burdens-set out in §4-and my overall conclusion is that a moral realist has no choice but to take on those burdens. This conclusion depends on ruling out other stances a realist might take towards moral immunity.
What follows is written in the spirit of an invitation to those moral realists who don't like the conclusion to supply something better. There is no space here to anticipate all conceivable realist responses, and personal judgment is a factor in how much space to give even to those I do consider.
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My sense is that at least some of them could be developed so as to converge with (e). In that case, however, they would share (e)'s burdensome consequences.
I start, then, with three attempts to show that moral immunity is but an illusion, making its compatibility with moral realism moot.
(a) The moral immunity phenomenon presupposes that you can derive an 'ought' from an 'is'; but as Hume pointed out, you can't.
The studies sketched in §1 were presented as having potential moral import. Citing Hume on the impossibility of deriving an ought from an is, a moral realist could insist that the studies must all have been misleadingly described, and hence that we never really have to choose between an existing moral view and a scientific finding. If this is right, the argument from moral immunity is presupposing a phenomenon that doesn't really exist.
Looking at Hume's dictum in context helps us to see where this response goes wrong. He was making a purely formal point: that you need a bridging premise to get from a set of premises that makes no mention of morality to a conclusion that does, and the bridging premise would itself need to include a moral component. 10 Hume makes this formal point while drawing out the implications of his foundationalist empiricism, which had led him to wonder where the evidence for moral claims 9 My experience has been that realists vary considerably in how they respond to the argument from immunity. Strategies dismissed by some as straw targets are heralded by others as clearly along the right track. This is true of the approaches I consider in the main text as well as others I have not included, such as that of trying to explain science's immunity to moral refutation in terms of our resistance to the ad misericordiam fallacy. 10 See final paragraph of 3.1.1 of his Treatise. I say 'purely formal' because the point is general. Setting aside trivial cases, the same would hold of an inference from premises that make no mention of water to a conclusion that does.
could come from. Because his contemporaries had failed to spot the need for well-supported bridging premises, they were in effect cheating.
Moral realists are well advised to steer clear of Hume's astringent epistemology, not least because of the subjectivist direction in which it took Hume himself. But the simple formal point-the catchy is/ought slogan divorced from Hume's broader empiricism-won't help them either because the immunity phenomenon is undisturbed by it. The phenomenon was characterized in §1 in terms of how we may respond to inconsistent sets. To be genuinely inconsistent these sets will include bridging assumptions of precisely the kind that Hume's contemporaries supposedly overlooked.
Once an inconsistency is established, though, the immunity phenomenon is readily described. To reverse the slogan, we are resistant to inferring an is from an ought. The salient is will be the alleged scientific finding while the ought will really be a conjunction of all the oughts in the set together with any other background assumptions.
(b) We should sometimes question scientific judgments on moral grounds.
Not all inferences from moral premises to scientific or other non-moral conclusions are as immediately unappealing as those envisaged in §1. Nicholas Sturgeon notes how readily we might try to explain a growth in opposition to slavery by noting its increasingly oppressive character, or the degradation and death of millions by reference to Hitler's depravity [1988: 232, 245] . These explanations embody inferences from premises involving the moral concepts oppression and depravity. Do they show, then, that the immunity phenomenon is not genuine and hence that realists are under no pressure to explain it?
Before accepting this we should recall that, as with Hume's dictum, Sturgeon's examples have their own context. He is responding to Gilbert Harman's [1977] claim that purported moral facts are explanatorily inert (unless given a reductionist translation), depriving (non-reductionist) ethical naturalists of inference to the best explanation as a route out of moral scepticism. The Harman-Sturgeon exchange is not my direct concern here, and its connection to the moral immunity phenomenon is subtle. One obvious contrast is that it is concerned with the availability of evidence running from non-moral to moral, by inference to the best explanation, whereas the present paper is asking about evidence in the other direction. will be sympathetic to the first disjunct, but will still need to explain the apparent exceptionality of the other cases, possibly by drawing on (c)-(e) in the hope that these don't undermine the Sturgeoncases. Strategy (b) alone will not suffice. But the second disjunct is more tempting in any case, in so 11 Harman does talk of morality's 'apparent immunity from observational testing ' [1977: vii] , but this is immunity in the non-moral-to-moral direction. 12 Suppose I wish to know whether a regime in 4500BCE survived to 4400BCE. The later historical record is inconclusive. I uncover credible evidence that in 4500BCE the regime was oppressive in a way that can (assuming Sturgeon is right and Harman wrong) explain regime collapse. This gives me defeasible evidence that it did not survive. (with the possible exception of (iv), for reasons discussed already). Still (and as with (iv)), Sturgeon- type cases do at least suggest we need to qualify the immunity phenomenon as the unavailability to science of evidence with a non-bracketable moral ingredient.
13 'Bracket', like 'be agnostic about' in the next note, should not be equated with 'treat as false'. Comments by Sturgeon [1988: 250] could encourage such a reading. Beyond making this point I leave it open how bracketability in my sense intersects with the Harman-Sturgeon debate. 14 We could explain increased resistance to slavery, for example, as arising from the fact that people came to regard the institution as increasingly oppressive, took this increase to undermine its legitimacy, and were spurred to action by this assessment. Here, the moral dimension of the explanation is placed within psychological operators and there is no need for us to take a stand on whether the institution really is oppressive, illegitimate, or deserving of resistance. We can be agnostic about these questions without harming the explanation. An alternative or complementary route to rephrasing would involve teasing apart the moral and non-moral dimension of the concept of oppression-cf. the treatment of honesty in §1.
(c) Science is not immune to moral refutation but the evidence we have for our moral judgments is generally weak when set against the evidence of our eyes and ears.
Only extreme moral sceptics can reasonably be classified as anti-realists (see §2). Weak or moderate sceptics-still realists, potentially-can try to explain moral immunity away by noting the relative frailty (as opposed to non-existence) of the evidence underpinning moral judgments when it is set against the robust perceptual evidence underpinning science. A realist could respond that intuition is on her side here. Suppose you think the empirical data support Theory X over its competitors by the slimmest of margins. An infallible oracle then informs you that if X is correct then it is permissible to torture irritating neighbours. Should this testimony not require us to assign a lower probability to X? My own sense is that it should not, but contrary intuitions call for comment.
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One consideration is that our moral values seems to affect our intuitions about non-moral questions, without our realising it, even in scenarios where this influence is manifestly illicit (see 15 Realists frequently stress the defeasibility of the evidence for moral claims. See e.g. Knobe [2010] and in particular the studies sketched on pp. 317-20). Whatever cognitive mechanism is at work in these settings-and it seems to be unconscious save at the output-level of intuitions about cases-could also explain why the oracle's testimony translate into a downgrading of the overall state of evidence for X.
Knobe's work is controversial, so a different possibility is that, because oracles (in fiction) are respected for their global wisdom, the scenario above is easily conflated with a distinct case in which the oracle also informs us, again in a trustworthy fashion, that gratuitous torture is wrong. We'd be right to respond to this fictional event by rejecting X, but that hardly shows we could ever in reality use moral reasoning as a source of evidence in science. If we stipulate that the original oracle has no opinion either way on the wrongness of torture-if we assume only that it is exceptionally good at drawing out the implications of scientific theories-then we get to something closer to what we have in reality: evidence of inconsistencies between scientific theories and moral opinions. But our reaction to this explicitly pared-down oracle, I suggest, is more likely to be one of re-evaluating the state of evidence for our moral theory-all the more so if the oracle tells us why and not only that X is incompatible with our existing moral outlook. Given more information about the nature of the conflict, X could turn out to undermine rather than simply outweigh the evidence coming from gratuitous torture's wrongness. Whether science undermines or merely tends to outweigh the evidence we have for contrary moral judgments is not something we can settle using under-described fictional examples.
I turn now from attempts to explain moral immunity away to attempts to explain it that are compatible with moral realism.
(d) Moral immunity is just a symptom of moral supervenience
Most realists assume that moral properties supervene on physical properties. Can they use this supervenience relation to explain science's immunity to moral counterevidence? Perhaps there is a connection, but if so it is not immediately obvious. It is one thing to say that there can be no difference in A-properties without a change in B-properties; it is quite another to say that evidence drawn from domain A can have no bearing on the plausibility of claims made in domain B. Moral supervenience is a thesis of the first kind, a metaphysical one, while moral immunity is a thesis of the second kind, an epistemic one. That both theses are plausible in the present case does not make the first explanatory of the second, if only because some instances of the metaphysical thesis are true without that truth carrying over to the parallel epistemic thesis. The mental supervenes on the physical, for example, but no one insists on the immunity of neurophysiological claims to psychological evidence. Quite the opposite, in fact: someone's feeling a sharp pain is treated as evidence that their C-fibres are firing. In contrast, a strong intuition that it is okay to eat fish counts not in the least against the scientific evidence (such as it is) that fish can suffer extreme pain.
So far in this section I have been advising against various accounts of moral immunity that
could attract a realist first confronted with the argument from moral immunity. I end with a more promising rejoinder. Indeed, I hold that it is the only potentially viable response. This is important because it has consequences (described in §4) that many realists will be unwilling to embrace. It is entirely possible that this final response is but a charitable development of one or more of the responses just dismissed; 17 even so, it is only in this final formulation that the potentially unwelcome consequences become manifest.
(e) Moral immunity reflects the fact that moral judgments are practical in nature
Moral reasoning is a form of practical reasoning: it aims to tell us how we ought to act given our circumstances. Telling us what those circumstances are is the function of theoretical (including scientific) reasoning. Noting this practical/theoretical distinction does not immediately deal with our puzzle. It fails to tell us why I shouldn't take a highly plausible judgment concerning how I ought to act as a sign that circumstances must be such and such and not so and so (given that, were they so and so, it wouldn't be true that I ought to act in this way). So to develop the suspicion that the practical dimension of moral reasoning is key to the immunity phenomenon, let's temporarily rid ourselves of the complexities associated with moral cases and focus instead on a simple case of prudential reasoning.
You want pizza. You believe there is a pizzeria in your nearest town. At this point a trip to the town is looking highly prudent (we'll assume it is healthy pizza). Then, though not vividly, you recall someone telling you something about the pizzeria having closed down. It would be perverse of you to reason that, since travelling to the town is prudentially reasonable, the testimony must have been flawed or else garbled in your memory. The prudential reasonableness of the trip is not just very weak as evidence against the faintly remembered testimony; rather, it is no evidence whatsoever. evidence against C would be utterly circular. T can add nothing to the existing evidence for not-C because T is devoid of support that is independent of your assumption that not-C.
This highly intuitive analysis of the prudential case paves the way for a structurally identical explanation of science's moral immunity. That phenomenon was described in §1 as a puzzle over why membership of an inconsistent set fails to constitute evidence against an alleged scientific finding when that set includes, inter alia, previously secure moral judgments. What explains this failure is the innocent fact that the set will always contain a moral judgment lacking in independent support. This is clearest in the fish-consumption case. Using the moral permissibility of fish consumption as part of a case against the marine biologists' studies would involve circular reasoning.
The evidence for this moral assumption is exhausted by its derivability from, among other things, the claim that fish consumption does not cause significant pain. One claim cannot be used to defend another if all its own plausibility depends essentially on the other claim's being correct.
Notice, too, that immunity would vanish in both prudential and moral cases if the relevant practical judgments were suddenly to acquire independent support. Imagine God appeared and informed you, convincingly, that you should go to the nearby town. Even if he didn't tell you why, his testimony would transform your original prudential judgment into evidence that the pizzeria is still in business. If he also told you that it is morally permissible to consume fish without saying why, the scientific studies would immediately lose their immunity to moral refutation. This observation adds ballast to the thought that missing independent support is what really accounts for the immunity phenomenon.
To summarize, a survey of options suggests that the only plausible realist response to the argument from moral immunity emerges from an analogy with prudential cases. Whenever we have a moral argument against a scientific finding, one of the moral premises will depend for all its plausibility on the argument's conclusion, making the argument essentially circular. In the next section I explore this response further, arguing that it affects different forms of moral realism differently. Specifically, it calls into question a popular model of moral theorizing, the scienceanalogy model, and so has knock-on effects for related conceptions of the structure of evidence.
Implications of moral immunity for case-driven moral reasoning
This section revolves around two claims. The first is that the realist response just outlined carries she then attempts to sense, feel, or intuit the moral facts of the case-she 'consults her moral intuitions'-and finds herself thinking that she should A or else that she needn't or mustn't. Intuitive judgments are the analogue of perceptual judgments, and depending on whether they accord with the conditional, they either do or do not support the moral theory that entails the conditional.
To see how this familiar model clashes with the strategic division, notice that in science perceptual data has to supply O with support that is independent of O's derivability from the conjunction of C plus the hypothesis being tested. The moral methodology appears to require the same. To support a moral theory, my intuitive responses to scenarios must do more than concur with it; they must have independent support, support that goes beyond their derivability from the theory plus the real or imagined circumstances. In a paradigmatic use of this methodology, his Experience
Machine example, Robert Nozick warns of this need for our intuitions about scenarios to be independent of the theory they are testing:
[The] example must be looked at on its own; to answer the question by filtering it through a fixed view . Herein lies the problem. Such independent support is explicitly ruled out by the strategic division.
Contingently situated judgments with the form 'I should A' belong to the m-class of moral judgments. The only support they can have consists in their derivability from judgments in the Mclass plus relevant non-moral judgments. If we supposed them to have independent support, realists would need some other way of explaining science's moral immunity.
Things are hardly that simple. Realists who like the science-analogy model have two potentially strong rejoinders available. Both turn on differences they may be willing to accept between scientific and moral reasoning. The first difference is that scenarios tend to be fictional in ethics but not in science. The second is that, while perception in science is meant to supply us with evidence for the scientific theory rather help us identify our prior scientific commitments, consulting our moral intuitions could be construed as an aid to identifying our broader moral commitments rather than as a source of evidence for those commitments. Discussing these two differences, especially the second, will help us to appreciate which kinds of realism are called into question by the moral immunity phenomenon and which kinds are not.
The fictionality of many scenarios does not eliminate the conflict between case-based moral reasoning and the strategic division. To see why, let's distinguish between m R -and m I -class judgments, according to whether the situation prompting the judgment is real or imaginary. This allows us to clarify the first rejoinder but also to see why it fails. Suppose a science-analogy model purist insists on using only m R -class judgments for moral reasoning. Intuitions generated by real-life morally charged situations-hostage takings, marital betrayals, etc.-can be used to support moral hypotheses, says this purist, but intuitions arising from fictional scenarios cannot. This view is straightforwardly incompatible with making the strategic division to explain science's moral immunity. Few supporters of the science-analogy model are purists in this fashion. They can therefore maintain that our m I -class judgments have independent support (this being good enough for case-driven moral reasoning) while our m R -class judgments lack independent support (this being good enough for a version of the strategic division that can explain science's moral immunity).
This first rejoinder trips up on the observation that if our m I -class judgments have independent support, so too must our m R -class judgments. Overstressing the fictionality of many cases used in moral theorizing means we miss something important: that our moral judgment develops as we live through or seek out and learn from morally charged real events-visiting an abattoir, say, or giving up a child for adoption. Even fictional cases work only in so far as they produce in us the reaction that would have been produced had the events occurred 'for real'. The same cognitive structures are at work in each case-running offline or on, so to speak-and they deliver the same normative output. In view of this, a realist supporter of the science-analogy model cannot save the strategic division by drawing a contrast between m I -and m R -class judgments and assuming that only the former have independent support. And since they cannot make the strategic division, it is a consequence of their view-though very much an unintended one-that moral judgments can be cited in evidence for non-moral, and in particular scientific, judgments. an intellectual rather than a sensory or quasi-sensory capacity, slot more easily into the category of those I just said I was not arguing against. They hold that our judgments about cases are but symptoms of a commitment to intuitive general principles. The present objection merely forces them to be explicit about the lack of independent support provided to these general commitments by reflection on particular cases.
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'Reflective equilibrium' can pick out either a method of moral reasoning or a theory of justification often affiliated to that method. The method involves reconciling considered judgments about real or imagined cases with more general judgments, giving up judgments of either kind in order to maximize coherence. Though compatible with a foundationalist account of moral evidence, this method is more naturally associated with a coherentist account in which any support attaching to individual members of a set of judgments is enhanced by that set's coherence [Daniels 1979; SayreMcCord 1996] . This coherentism is incompatible with making the strategic division. Coherentists therefore face the charge that an alliance between the undifferentiated totality of our moral judgments could be used to do science. The strategic division is also unavailable to those who combine reflective-equilibrium methodology with a kind of 'bottom-up' foundationalism in which the foundation set consists of moral judgments about real or imaginary cases rather than judgments of general moral principle. Because the foundation provides bottom-up support to general principles, general principles and particular judgments could, as with coherentism, act in unison to refute scientific studies that conflict with a reasoned moral outlook. 24 The only users of reflectiveequilibrium methodology with nothing to worry about hold that a foundational category (the Mclass) of moral principles is not in the least reliant for support on the (m-class) judgments we make in response to real or imagined scenarios, and conceive of the method merely as a useful way to ascertain which principles are in fact foundational.
A realist unhappy at being boxed in in this way could respond that the independent support possessed by our particular, situated moral judgments is defeasible rather than non-existent.
Immunity, on this picture, arises because this independent support is undermined (and not merely outweighed 25 ) in any conflict with science; but so long as it remains undefeated this support can be drawn on in the usual way for the purposes of moral reasoning. A parallel can be drawn with perceptual illusion. Consider a sighted but naïve person who, for the first time, sees a stick immersed in water and takes it to be bent. His perceptual justification is independent in the sense of not being 24 Uniting the views I am arguing against here is a commitment to particular moral judgments having independent (i.e. non-derivational) support. Whether this independent support is taken to carry the rest ('bottom-up foundationalism') or is merely added to the mix ('coherentism') is unimportant. The challenge facing anyone with this commitment is to say why this independent support can lend credence to our moral principles without being useable in the non-moral domain. Some possible attempts to meet the challenge are dealt with elsewhere in the paper, e.g. that cases are often fictional (see earlier in this section); that cases have independent support that is weak relative to, and hence outweighed by, evidence in the scientific domain (see (c) in §3 and note 18); or that this independent support is undermined and not merely outweighed by empirical discoveries (see the remaining two paragraphs in this section). 25 For reasons to think that scientific evidence does not merely outweigh moral evidence, see (c) in §3 and note 18.
derived: he just (thinks he) sees a bend in the stick. This justification is undermined by an explanation of the stick's appearance in terms of refraction. Saying it is undermined is not the same as saying that his judgment was never justified, but nor is it the same as allowing that the appearance of a bend somehow still weighs, just a little, against a physicist's account of what is going. It doesn't count at all because the physicist's account incorporates an explanation of the appearance of a bend.
Notice that even top-down theorists allow that the justification possessed by situated moral judgments is undermined by contrary scientific findings. According to them, though, the undermined justification is derivational-rather than independent as the current response requires. The key question, then, is whether, when a scientific finding undermines a particular moral judgment, it is undermining an independent justification (as with perceptual illusion) or just a derivational justification. To answer this, imagine a world in which our situated normative judgments are very much independent: they are prompted by a distinctive Nietzschean whiff. We can literally smell the moral facts. 26 In this world it would be reasonable for us to draw on moral evidence in the scientific domain. For a contrary scientific finding to undermine (rather than outweigh) this independent olfactory evidence would take rather more than saying 'You were wrong about the non-moral facts on which the truth of your moral judgment depended'. It would require an explanation of how our misleading moral sense of smell arose. The fact that nothing like this is ever needed in reality-the fact that all we feel we need to say is that the judger has made a flawed non-moral assumption-is a sign, not only that that there is no Nietzschean whiff (which we knew already), but also that it has no surrogate in the form of defeasible but independent evidence for situated moral judgments. The evidence we possess for particular moral judgments can be undermined in the simple way that only a top-down theorist predicts.
Conclusion
Moral anti-realists can readily account for science's apparent immunity to moral refutation. Options for moral realists are more limited. They must deny that particular moral judgments about either fictional scenarios or real events have independent evidential support, i.e. support going beyond their derivability from general principles and the non-moral facts of the case. A top-down, theory-first foundationalist moral epistemology, in which a priori moral principles support but are not supported by judgments about particular cases, offers the only likely route to a realist treatment of science's apparent moral immunity.
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